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Convergence in European Policy Making: 
What do Article 15 (FCNM) and the EU 
Regional Policy have in common? 
   
Minority protection is expanding its focus from protection-only to protection-
and-empowerment, or from a politics of identity to a politics of identity related 
interests. To most, minority protection means the idea that there are compelling 
reasons why members of ethnic, cultural, national, racial and linguistic 
minorities require certain special protection rights in order not to suffer 
assimilation, suppression or persecution. However, in the European context, 
minority protection has also come to mean a right to attain a decent life. A 
decent life means a good life. The notion of the good life is of course essentially 
contested. The problem of protecting the right to a good life is not therefore what 
is a good life? – but how do minorities achieve and enjoy what they consider a 
good life?  
 
In the European minority rights regime, minorities 
are offered the opportunity to achieve a good life 
through the right to participation in public affairs. 
Participation in public affairs enables minorities to 
influence the democratic process to design 
frameworks that ensure a good life for all members of 
society. In other words, participation in public life is 
the means by which minorities can table their 
interests in a democratic manner because conceptions 
of a good life are defended through interests. 
However, democratic participation of minorities 
is not effectively implemented in Europe. It is beyond 
this paper to address the numerous reasons why 
individual states do not implement the standard. 
Instead, it is argued that we may find opportunities 
for minority empowerment through democratic 
participation in the European Union (EU) economic 
instruments for regional development. But in taking 
this step towards empowering members of minorities 
through democratic participation in regional 
economic development, we encounter a number of 
issues regarding the tool kit of concepts that is 
needed to make this process democratic. Participatory 
citizenship, social capital, de-essentialized inter-
cultural dialogue, de-anachronized kin-state relations 
are among the issues relevant for a well stocked tool-
kit. 
Taking stock of trends in minority 
protection 
 
In Europe the minority rights scheme grew as a result 
of conflict settlements and attempts to prevent future 
conflicts. We have come to agree that members of 
minorities should not be penalized as a result of 
conflicts between national states, and thus there were 
compelling reasons to protect the identity of members 
of what came to be known as national minorities. It 
was decided that minority identity meant culture and 
language. Hence, most minority rights focus on how 
to protect these. This was the case in the Minorities 
Treaties, and it became the major focus of the United 
 ECMI- Issue Brief  
 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
Nations (UN) system of individual minority rights. 
Culture and language are also the reason why we 
codify non-discrimination rights. In the Council of 
Europe minority rights have likewise focused on non-
discrimination and individual human rights protecting 
culture and language.  
However, when the EU entered the discourse, it 
did not initially bring any innovation to the fore. In 
its aim to prevent new conflicts in the enlargement 
states, the EU set conditions that followed the same 
pattern and indeed referred to the rights noted above. 
Moreover, as we know, the EU did not have any 
intention to apply these conditions internally. Later, 
however, the EU improved on this and codified non-
discrimination rights across the board. This time it 
had a different purpose though, the EU was aiming at 
economic development.  
So the trend in Europe has therefore been shifting 
from conflict prevention (after World War I) through 
human rights (after World War II) to conflict 
prevention (after 1989) through conditionality based 
on human rights (after 1993) to social inclusion 
through non-discrimination (after 2000) depending 
on which international mechanism was acting in the 
arena. The adoption and ratification of the reformed 
Lisbon Treaty in 2007 did not bring any promise of 
new standards but perhaps a hope for mainstreaming 
in EU policies.   
Taking stock of concepts applied in 
the protection of minority identity  
 
But if we examine these trends more closely in terms 
of the concepts that guided these trends, we find a 
slightly more nuanced picture. We find non-
discrimination codified by almost every one of the 
mechanisms mentioned above, from the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (2000). Similarly, we find the right to 
culture in the UN’s International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, Art. 27 as well 
as in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Ethnic or 
National, Religious and Linguistic minorities of 1992 
(hereafter UN Declaration). The Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) of 1995 also protects the right to 
culture and some would say the right to cultural 
autonomy. It protects the right to speak and learn 
your mother tongue, whereas the Language Charter 
seeks to protect not the right but the minority 
languages. However, in both the UN Declaration and 
the FCNM, we also find a new concept, namely 
participation. In the FCNM we find this explicitly in 
Art. 15 and implicitly in Art. 17. This is the 
beginning of the expansion of focus noted in the 
beginning. It has been largely neglected in the first 
years of the life of these instruments not by 
practitioners but by scholars. It is now increasingly 
becoming the focus of attention throughout the 
community of minority rights observers. Why this 
attention now?  
The aim of the right to participation is not 
explicitly protection of the identity of minorities but 
empowerment of minorities as actors to self-protect 
through democratic dialogue, democratic co-
management and democratic co-decision making. 
This is what Philip Allott calls “society self-
creating.” Allott argues that  
… the process of social self-creating is as energetic 
and complex and dense and continuous as the process 
of life itself. Society is a self-creating structure-
system for the socializing of desire and obligation 
and will and action through the mediation of value. 
And all such self-creating is the work of 
consciousness, using imagination and reason to 
generate society’s self-creating words and ideas and 
theories and values. And all such self-creating 
struggle, as society struggles with all that it is and all 
that it is not and all that it could be.1   
 
The right to participation thus does not guarantee the 
protection of one’s culture and language. Rather, it 
promotes the right to become socialized while 
preserving one’s culture and language, i.e. one’s 
identity. According to Allott this is necessary because 
society self-creating involves a number of dilemmas, 
namely dilemmas of identity and power, dilemmas of 
will and order, and the dilemma of becoming. To 
mitigate these dilemmas society and law must go 
hand-in-hand.  
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Evaluating trends in protection 
schemes 
 
Some have seen this trend. Sia Spiliopoulou 
Åkermark has noticed in February 2007 that there is a 
shift in the justification of minority protection 
towards democratic participation.2 Åkermark bases 
her argument on the right to participation in Art. 15 
of the FCNM and Art. 25 of the ICCPR. Will 
Kymlicka agrees with the general line of Åkermark’s 
argument. However, he is very pessimistic that this 
shift is maybe not a shift but rather a discourse used 
by the international community when times are 
good.3 When conflicts are looming standards become 
less democratic. 
Basically, Kymlicka evaluates the 
internationalization of state-minority relations seen 
from the perspective of liberal multiculturalism. He 
criticizes this international process for not being able 
to implement liberal multiculturalism because the 
process fails on three accounts, (1) categorization of 
rights, (2) rights as conditionality, and (3) the 
purposes of rights. The first problem is exemplified 
in that international instruments address both generic 
rights and targeted rights, i.e. both human rights and 
special rights for national minorities and indigenous 
peoples. The second problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that international instruments are imposed on 
weak states and states in development, thus often 
states are simply not able to implement rights to the 
level of the conditions set in these instrument. The 
third problem is the problem of seeking to prevent 
conflicts with human rights while also wishing to 
open the democratic space for minority participation 
creates a dilemma. Instead of rewarding minorities 
for democratic participation, we reward them for 
belligerence. This problem is global but in particular 
acute in the European context.4 Our handling of this 
dilemma is confused, almost schizophrenic, 
according to Kymlicka.5 One may agree with 
Kymlicka even if he appears to base his argument on 
codified rights and not the opinions issued by for 
instance the Advisory Committee to the FCNM. 
Nevertheless, his point is taken that opening up the 
democratic process to militant minorities has resulted 
in rewarding violence over democratic means. 
Northern Ireland is one example.  
Michael Keating has a purely political approach 
to conflict between minority nations and majorities 
that are forced to find ways to live together.6 
According to his view what is missing is a 
philosophy of co-operation that binds minorities and 
majorities together and gives them democratic 
rationale.7 He is not arguing that he has found the 
panacea which fosters this philosophy but he holds 
that certain principles, such as respect for difference, 
suspending belief in old doctrines of sovereignty, and 
putting the state in proper perspective may get us part 
of the way. In short, standard setting is helpful for the 
emancipation of minorities but it does not ensure the 
empowerment of minorities in their own societies.8 
This is the Allott argument about the self-creation of 
societies.  
However, one could take this further and argue 
for the empowerment of minorities through European 
Union (EU) integration, especially the EU’s 
economic policies. The EU is increasingly becoming 
aware of the need to empower ethnic minorities and 
immigrants as well as national minorities. In the 
following, we concentrate on national minorities.  
 
 
Article 15 of the FCNM   
 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for 
the effective participation of persons belonging to 
national minorities in cultural, social and economic 




Minority empowerment through 
participation  
 
To understand what standards EU policies may 
promote, it is helpful to start with the standard in 
question. Article 15 of the FCNM provides a 
definition that assumes that national minorities 
should participate in democratic life, not only the part 
affecting them but also in mainstream society affairs. 
It does not state specifically political participation but 
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experts have analyzed this article and declared that 
there is no question that it also includes participation 
in political affairs.9  Moreover, experts read this 
article to include inter-cultural dialogue as a 
permanent function of minority-majority relations. 
The Explanatory Report offers some further ideas of 
practical institutionalizing of the provision. 
The method of interest here is the second one 
seeking to promote the need to include minorities in 
the preparation, implementation and assessment of 
national and regional development plans. This is 




The Explanatory Report states five methods that are 
relevant for the implementation of the Article 15 of 
the FCNM: 
 
• consultation with these persons, by means of 
appropriate procedures and, in particular, 
through their representative institutions, when 
Parties are contemplating legislation or 
administrative measures likely to affect them 
directly; 
• involving these persons in the preparation, 
implementation and assessment of national and 
regional development plans and programmes 
likely to affect them directly;  
• undertaking studies, in conjunction with these 
persons, to assess the possible impact on them 
of projected development activities;  
• effective participation of persons belonging to 
national minorities in the decision-making 
processes and elected bodies both at national 




Furthermore, the Advisory Committee has taken 
the stand that institutionalizing is clearly part of the 
implementation of this Article. Hence, full 
participation of minorities in public life includes 
political participation and permanent dialogue.  
In addition, as noted, Article 17 of the FCNM is 
relevant to this argument. This Article provides for 
the right to network across borders and inter-
regionally and internationally. Since most national 
minorities live in border regions this provision is 
extremely important. The relations to the kin-state are 
vital for national minorities even if it is problematic 
from an international security perspective. 
 
Article 17 of the FCNM   
 
1. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the 
right of persons belonging to national minorities 
to establish and maintain free and peaceful 
contacts across frontiers with persons lawfully 
staying in other States, in particular those with 
whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 
religious identity, or a common cultural 
heritage.  
2. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the 
right of persons belonging to national minorities 
to participate in the activities of non-
governmental organisations, both at the 
national and international levels.  
 
 
However, whereas the Explanatory Report 
argues that this is a provision to help minorities 
protect their identity, I would argue that it is also 
a politics of interest provision that may support 
Article 15 and the method of preparation, 
implementation and assessment of national and 
regional development plans. The reason for this 
is that minorities can use their kin-state relations 
as well as relations to other national minorities 
in a border region to identify opportunities for 
regional development. This has been empirically 
assessed in recent research on the social and 
human capital of national minorities in the 
Danish-German border region as will be 
discussed below.10  
Minority empowerment through 
the Regional Policy  
 
The area of EU integration policies where national 
minorities can participate in the preparation, 
implementation and assessment of national and 
regional development plans is the Regional Policy. 
This Policy is one of the building blocs of the Lisbon 
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Strategy which aimed at making the European 
economic area grow and reach certain targets by 
2010. The 2000 European Council at Lisbon set the 
strategic goal for the EU of becoming the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.  
Adopting the Lisbon Strategy, the EU formulated 
a number of measures to facilitate the shift towards 
an information society, stimulate research and 
development and the creation of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME), take further measures to 
complete the internal market, ensure sustainability of 
public finance, and modernise the European Social 
Model by strengthening education and training, 
developing an active employment policy and 
modernising social protection.11  
 
The specific Lisbon Strategy objectives were 
• To establish an inclusive, dynamic and 
knowledge based economy,  
• To produce accelerated and sustained economic 
growth,  
• To restore full employment as the key objective 
of economic and social policy, and reduce 
unemployment to the levels already achieved by 
the best performing countries, and  
• To modernize our social protection systems 
 
 
The European Council at Lisbon considered that 
the overall aim of the Lisbon Strategy was to raise 
the employment rate from an average of 61 per cent 
in 2000 to 70 per cent by 2010 and to increase the 
number of women in employment from an average of 
51 per cent in 2000 to more than 60 per cent in 2010. 
In March 2010, a European Summit agreed that goals 
had not been achieved and a new Strategy for 2020 
was adopted. The employment goals were 
implemented through the Social Agenda which 
included programmes such as the Employment 
Guidelines and the Open Method of Co-ordination, 
both of which are measures that could empower 
immigrants and ethnic minorities. In fact, including 
minorities in these programmes is legally based in the 
Treaty of the European Community Article 13. 
However, our concern is with the first objective of 
the Lisbon Strategy, the objective to establish an 
inclusive, dynamic and knowledge based economy. 
Here national minorities in border regions can 
participate and have participated even without 
codified rights to participation.  
Notwithstanding the alleged failure of the Lisbon 
Strategy, the Regional Policy motors on for another 
three years at least. The purpose of the Regional 
Policy is to show solidarity and remain competitive.12 
It is designed to bring about concrete results, 
furthering economic and social cohesion and to 
reduce the gap between the development levels of the 
various regions. From a scientific perspective, the 
Regional Policy is supposed to bring added value to 
actions on the ground. The Policy finances concrete 
projects for regions, towns and their inhabitants with 
a view to create potentials so that the regions can 
fully contribute to achieving greater growth and 
competitiveness.  
Regions are divided into four categories of 
current level of growth that correspond to two 
objectives of the policy (see Table 1 appended). The 
first objective, the “convergence objective” is to 
promote growth-enhancing conditions and factors 
leading to real convergence for the least-developed 
regions whereas the second, the “regional 
competitiveness and employment objective” aims at 
strengthening competitiveness and attractiveness, as 
well as employment. This latter objective follows a 
two-fold approach. First, development programmes 
will help regions to anticipate and promote economic 
change through innovation and the promotion of the 
knowledge society, entrepreneurship, the protection 
of the environment, and the improvement of their 
accessibility. Second, more and better jobs will be 
supported by adapting the workforce and by investing 
in human resources. The need to develop regions is 
therefore a vital aspect of the EU’s attempt to 
improve outlying regions according to the Lisbon 
Strategy goals. The fact that many of these regions 
are home to national minorities makes this area of EU 
integration policies interesting from a perspective of 
empowering minorities. Table 1 indicates which 
regions are relevant from this perspective.  
The argument that regions and their national 
minorities are part of the overall EU integration 
strategy is actually not new. Michael Keating and 
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John Loughlin noted in 1997 that historical and 
ethnic regions which are culturally distinct from the 
majority of a national state have attempted to develop 
models of regional economic development based on 
the competitive advantage that their cultures may 
have in comparison to other European regions.13 The 
regions that Keating ad Loughlin referred to then 
were by and large autonomous regions in Western 
Europe, such as Catalonia, the Basque country and 
Scotland. These regions experienced movements of 
cultural promotion linking up with ideas of economic 
development. This Keating and Loughlin argued  
 
… attempts to preserve features such as the 
regional language and culture while at the same time 
providing both sufficient employment for young 
people and a rich cultural life for the inhabitants of 
the region and those whom it hopes to persuade to 
invest in the region.14  
 
Keating went on to develop this idea into his 
theory “new regionalism” in 1998.15 This theory does 
not address national minority empowerment per se 
but shows that in the new competitive drive among 
regions in the EU to develop economically is closely 
linked to the presence of national minorities in these 
regions. His theory argues that development 
strategies at the regional level are modernizing and 
forward-looking as opposed to the older tradition of 
provincialism that resisted change and defended 
traditions. Territories are being redefined and 
reconstituted on a broader view than that of the 
traditional national state outlook. Pressures from 
above and below are forcing regions to reassess their 
function. A functional pressure imposed by changing 
international markets and European integration is 
redefining the role of the regions as well as the socio-
economic space of regions.  
And Keating explains this development. The 
increasing importance of the region as a self-
identifier as opposed to the traditional national state 
identification has implications for the future of 
regional politics as well as inter-regional and co-
regional politics. Mechanisms are developed to deal 
with the changing global outlook of the economic 
and cultural landscapes. These mechanisms pay 
attention not only to the promotion of local economic 
growth but also to the construction of identities, 
territorial solidarities and territorially-based systems 
of action. In this scenario national minority cultures 
are revalorized and made more visible through 
information technology and dissemination of cultural 
production. The value of national minority cultures is 
therefore entering the sphere of European integration.  
Keating specifically argues that national minority 
cultures become influential at the regional level in the 
political arenas where issues are framed, policies 
debated, decisions taken and resources allocated as 
well as in the competition for investment, markets 
and other opportunities as these aspects of regional 
life are less and less managed from the central level 
of the national state. In this system where the central 
state has lost monopoly, regions learn to relate 
directly to international regimes and the global 
market. As the competition at these levels is fierce, 
regions must define and redefine their competitive 
advantages and their success in exploiting these 
determines the future prosperity of the region. They 
must reconstitute their function not only in terms of 
economic management but also in terms of regional 
cultures and regional identities. The function of 
regions therefore becomes a laboratory where policy 
makers seek to maximize the capacity of their 
territory to compete by mobilizing local energies that 
are critical in the global economy.  
Local synergies based on complex networks of 
public-private linkages are extremely important in 
shaping strategies, and regional authorities often 
become the intermediaries in this process. Especially 
in regions where several minority cultures and 
diverse values cohabit, the mobilizing of local 
energies requires institutional set up. Where national 
minority languages used to be seen as languages of 
the periphery, they are now given new status not only 
in educational systems but also as promoters of 
commerce and trade. Cultural heritage industries 
have emerged in an effort to improve tourism, and 
the search for historical referents guide regions 
towards modernization through the bridging of the 
past, via the present, with the future. This trend has 
founded itself on a social realist footing that 
represents regional life as culturally pluralist based 
on diversity and social conflict. In the light of the 
revalorization of regional and national minority 
cultures, this cultural production becomes an 
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important tool in the creation of modern regional 
identity as it abandons the provincial, antiquarian and 
often nationalist connotations and emphasizes 
modernization and globalization in terms of value 
pluralism. The management of regions wishing to 
exploit the presence of diverse cultures and languages 
therefore requires institutional action plans that 
involve a large variety of players.  
Finally, Keating argues that collective action in 
the social space becomes a major force in the 
construction of regional profiles. The degree of 
associative life at the regional level as well as the 
impact of commercial and trade activities and the 
existence of regional mass media sustain the social 
space and frame issues in a regional perspective. 
Consultative bodies and multipartite institutions form 
an important function in this process. But it is 
important to note that these respond to separate 
constituencies. In order to be effective they must be 
supported by strong incentives from regional and 
central governments. This is particularly crucial to 
the redefinition of border regions. The basic 
argument here is that emancipation through rights is 
good but it is not enough. Effective participation is 
not feasible on the basis of rights alone.  
Notwithstanding this, there are experts that see 
the feasibility of empowering national minorities 
only through law. According to Olivier de Schutter, 
‘there are no provisions in EU law providing for the 
participation of national minorities in public, social 
and economic life in the EU Member States.’ Thus, 
‘under EU law, national minorities associations are 
not guaranteed a right to participate in public 
decision-making, or to be consulted.’16 According to 
this argument, there are only two ways in which the 
EU could play a future role in the protection and 
promotion of minority rights. One way would be to 
monitor more directly through the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency whether member states comply with 
the provisions of the FCNM and the Language 
Charter. The other way would be to adopt new 
legislation which implements the values of the 
FCNM. Neither option is attractive to the legal expert 
as in the first case scenario this would duplicate the 
monitoring that the Council of Europe is doing 
through its Advisory Committee to the FCNM. In the 
second case scenario, the legal expert cautions us that 
even if new legislation would be treaty based, it 
would move the attention of member states away 
from the implementation of the FCNM, thus taking 
the same route as the anti-discrimination legislation 
imposed by the EU has done. According to this 
argument, the EU anti-discrimination directives 
actually prevent the codification of special measures 
for ethnic or cultural, religious or linguistic 
minorities.17  
However, should one assume then that 
empowering national minorities through EU 
integration is a non sequitur because there is no legal 
basis for this? Is it not feasible that the economic 
approach to democratic participation that is offered 
by the Regional Policy could promote national 
minority empowerment? As Joseph Marko has noted 
in his commentary on Article 15, ‘the best legal 
instruments for “effective participation” cannot 
“ensure” this goal if there is not a political climate 
and willingness of inter-ethnic dialogue and co-
operation to give the members of national minorities 
a voice which is also “taken seriously.”’18 To this, 
one might add that effective participation may not be 
equivalent to empowerment until such time that 
members of national minorities are involved in the 
preparation, implementation and assessment of 
national and regional development plans and 
programmes likely to affect them directly. In other 
words, the Regional Policy of the EU may be the 
instrument that takes national minorities towards 
empowerment.  
The empirical research from the Danish-German 
border region mentioned above has shown that the 
good governance scheme put in place as a result of 
the implementation of the FCNM as well as legal 
standards adopted earlier has provided the national 
minorities in the border region with a platform from 
which to be heard, to present their interests and their 
views about regional development. But more 
importantly, the study found that the minorities 
contribute to the development processes through 
action. Especially, in the economic sector they have 
provided impetus for new cross-border co-operation 
projects. They participate in the regional political 
fora that define development strategies, such as the 
Euro-region Sønderjylland-Schleswig and the new 
INTERREG Commission established to define the 
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next five year programme INTERREG IV, now 
called Territorial Co-operation. The existence of self-
administered minority institutions furthermore 
provides the region with human and social capital 
that raises the level of these capitals in the region. 
Overall the national minorities in this border region 
contribute to society and regional development both 
in terms of participation and networking. They are 
showing that emancipation in terms of rights is one 
thing but empowerment in terms of participation and 
action in regional development is needed for full 
implementation of Article 15. And this might not 
have happened without the EU impetus towards 
regional development.  
Conceptual problem areas for the 
minority empowerment approach 
 
There are of course conceptual problems with 
bringing national minorities to the level of effective 
and empowered participation. When members of 
national minorities act on the basis of their interest in 
public affairs, they do this on the basis of their social 
and human capitals framed by their collective 
identities as well as on the ability to participate in the 
inter-cultural dialogue on equal footing and from a 
point of view of mutual understanding and respect.19 
Article 15 therefore requires not only that a model of 
democratic citizenship is fostered in the region but 
also that the parameters for inter-cultural dialogue are 
present. The concept of citizenship in terms of the 
traditional civil, political, socio-economic areas of 
participation is important in order that minorities can 
present their interests in a democratic way. But also 
concepts of culture, ethnicity, multiculturalism, and 
kin-state relations are relevant for understanding why 
and how these interests are being presented.   
Democratic citizenship and national 
minorities  
 
Although T.H. Marshall’s theory of citizenship 
(1963) has been discredited somewhat for not 
meeting the demands of late modern globalization, it 
is still instructive. Marshall defined citizenship as a 
status which is enjoyed by a person who is a full 
member of a community.20 It involves three 
components, the civil, the political and the social. 
Civil rights are necessary for individual freedoms. 
Political citizenship guarantees the right to participate 
in the exercise of political power, and social 
citizenship is the right to participate in an appropriate 
standard of living transferred through welfare and 
education systems. Scholars have since added the 
notion of the economic citizenship, i.e. the right to 
employment and to contribute to society. Clearly, all 
of these categories of citizenship are relevant to the 
idea of seeing members of national minorities as 
active citizens in the development of their regions. A 
large part of the Russian-speaking minority in 
Estonia has not even reached the first level of 
citizenship and clearly is years away from enjoying 
full citizenship in terms of participation. Others such 
as the national minorities in Norway are much closer 
to enjoying full citizenship. However, even in 
Norway the dialogue institutions are not functioning 
satisfactory according to the Advisory Committee 
and we have no numbers for participation in the 
public sector and judiciary. 
Will Kymlicka and Norman Wayne have 
theorized four similar levels of citizenship, (1) status 
as a legal citizen, (2) identity as a member of political 
community, (3) activity in terms of civic virtues, and 
(4) the ideal of social cohesion. In their view these 
categories encapsulate all the aspects and problems 
that citizenship carries. Other scholars have offered 
different views of “active citizenship.” Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum have developed the so-called 
capabilities approach to citizenship which is very 
much a development citizenship meaning that it 
emphasizes both individual development and the 
development of the society in which the individual is 
supposed to function as a citizen. Philip Pettit also 
advocates an active citizenship which he calls a 
republican citizenship.21 Republican citizenship 
focuses more on civic duties than civic rights. There 
is thus general consensus that citizenship of the late 
modern era is supposed to create an active life of full 
participation. The question of citizenship in terms of 
virtues as noted by Kymlicka and Norman has been 
theorized further by political philosophers such as 
Onora O’Neill who defends a cosmopolitan notion of 
citizenship that focuses on duties through individual 
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practical reasoning about action.22 William E. 
Connolly draws on a much less ambitious account of 
duties in his theory of critical responsiveness to 
citizenship and pluralism in modern societies. He 
argues that there will always be a distance in our 
togetherness but if we accept that we must show each 
other a limited amount of respect, or what he calls 
agonistic respect, then we may have peace.23 One 
might speak of critical citizenship.24 Basically, all 
these types of citizenship highlight the fact that for 
members of minorities to participate fully in the 
development of their own regions they must be 
empowered through a comprehensive approach to 
citizenship as active.  
Inter-cultural dialogue relations 
and minorities 
 
But active citizenship is not enough. If citizens are 
active they must also be in dialogue. The problem we 
encounter with regard to presenting minority interests 
in the inter-cultural dialogue is that the identity 
approach to minority protection has created a rather 
narrow perspective of minority cultures. Somehow 
the codified rights to protect culture and language 
have led to the assumption that minority cultures are 
static, homogenous groups of individuals who live 
only within the confines and boundaries of one 
minority culture. This essentialization of minorities 
as closed cultures has been amplified in the academic 
literature. It is therefore to some extent our own fault 
that we now have to criticize minority rights for 
promoting static views that inevitably lead to greater 
tensions in modern society.  
Anne Phillips has taken up this problem and 
argued that culture has been misrepresented as an all 
encompassing explanation for what members of 
minorities do.25 Phillips’s aim is to defend 
multiculturalism mainly from a point of view of 
feminism. Feminism and multiculturalism have run 
counter to each other for the very same reason that 
minority rights have become suspicious in the minds 
of many. The key point of Phillips’s argument is that 
cultures are not bounded, cultural meanings are 
internally contested, and cultures are not static but 
involved in a continuous process of change.26 Phillips 
aim is therefore not to do away with culture but to 
show us that culture as a concept needs to be de-
essentialized and thus broadened to include 
multiplicity of identities and loyalties. It will then 
allow for women’s equal rights to be retained and for 
minorities within minorities to enjoy equal rights.  
The project of multiculturalism has indeed come 
in for some criticism in the last few years. Some 
would argue that the crisis in multiculturalism is 
misinterpreted because it groups all types of 
minorities in one. Hence, national minorities and 
indigenous peoples as representing difference are 
grouped with immigrants who also represent 
difference. This is a mistake which leads to the view 
that multiculturalism is not working because it 
includes too diverse groups. However, as Kymlicka 
has argued the countries, which have seen a backlash 
on multiculturalism, are countries where integration 
policies aimed at immigrants have not worked.27 The 
integration and accommodation of national minorities 
and indigenous peoples have gone rather well.  
Another problem of minority identity is ethnicity. 
This relates even more directly to Article 15 and thus 
also to the argument for empowerment through 
regional development. Following somewhat similar 
argumentation as Phillips, Rogers Brubaker argues 
for deconstructing the notion of ethnicity.28 
According to Brubaker we have come to think of 
ethnicity in terms of “groupism,” or the idea that 
discrete, bounded groups are the basic constituents of 
social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and 
the fundamental units of social analysis.29 This 
essentialist view of groups has led us down a wrong 
path, according to Brubaker. There has been a 
tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and races as 
substantial entities to which interests and agency can 
be attributed. Such reification of groupism has 
procured a picture of ethnic groups as monochrome 
ethnic, racial or cultural blocs. Instead Brubaker 
argues for a conceptualization of groups not as 
substances or things or entities or organisms or 
collective individuals but rather as relational, 
processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated 
units.30 Brubaker argues that seeing ethnicity in these 
complex and contextual terms will help us see the 
true nature of for instance ethnic conflict not as 
conflicts between static groups but as conflicts of 
actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, 
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organizations, institutions, political projects, 
contingent events, and variable groupness.31 This 
argument has currency not only for analyzing ethnic 
conflicts but also for understanding minority rights in 
terms of ethics in policing and media and public 
sector participation.  
In fact, in understanding the entire project of 
codifying minority protection in terms of rights that 
protect the identity of minorities it is important to 
understand that identity is clearly not a static 
phenomenon. William Connolly has eloquently 
defended the view that identity is contingent, 
meaning that difference is intrinsically linked to 
personal identity and that personal identity is 
established in relation to a series of differences.32 
Without difference, personal identity cannot exist. 
Simultaneously within the process of personal self-
identification identity is fixed into a permanent form 
often thought to be the only true identity. However, 
in order to protect and maintain personal identity, 
differences may become converted into otherness. 
Otherness can be found on the range from unpleasant 
to evil. In sum, personal identity requires difference 
in order to exist, but it must often convert difference 
into otherness in order to secure its own self-
certainty. This conversion happens through a process 
of negation. Identity is thus a slippery, insecure 
experience, dependent on its ability to define 
difference it will counter, resist, overturn or subvert 
definitions of difference in order to eventually negate 
the difference.33 Identity stands in a complex, 
political relation to the differences it seeks to fix. It is 
an endless play of definition, counter-definition, and 
countering of counter-definitions. The contingency of 
identity is thus a stable part of identity itself. As we 
look for implementation of the rights that protect 
identities of minorities it is important that we see the 
contingency of identity. This is relevant in the market 
place of democratic participation, particularly in 
terms of the inter-cultural dialogue that is an 
important prerequisite for democratic participation.  
A final point of inter-cultural dialogue that creates 
dilemmas in societies with national minorities is the 
issue of kin-state relations. This is one of the 
thorniest points in minority rights codification as we 
have seen in the turbulence resulting from the 
Hungarian “status law” problematique. But from the 
point of view of national minorities voicing their 
interests in the democratic process of economic 
development of regions, this must be a problem of 
the past. National minorities can contribute to 
economic development by using their kin-state 
contacts. In the Danish-German border region the 
kin-state problem was settled years ago with by a 
“Declaration of Loyalty” issued by the German 
minority in Denmark to the Danish state – a unique 
approach not seen elsewhere. Networking with kin-
states for the purpose of economic development of 
border regions is a thing of the 21st century that 
cannot be solved with 19th century approaches. 
Especially, in the realm of the EU the fear of kin-
state relations seems almost an anachronism. 
Certainly, in the light of the EU Regional Policy it 
should be a long gone battle.  
Conclusions 
 
The argument that EU integration through the 
Regional Policy may eventually become the 
mechanism that implements Article 15 in terms of 
minority participation in the preparation, 
implementation and assessment of national and 
regional development plans and programmes likely 
to affect them directly as well as Article 17 in terms 
of innovative networking across borders, is 
contingent on certain conceptual views of 
participation. It has been argued that it must assume a 
democratic citizenship which allows members of 
minorities’ full participatory citizenship in order to be 
able to present their interests in a peaceful manner. It 
must allow members of minorities to accumulate 
social and human capitals upon which they can build 
their role of participation. Moreover, it must allow 
for a de-essentialized inter-cultural dialogue that does 
not rescind into static, homogenising views of 
culture. It must seek to deconstruct ethnicity in order 
that minorities are not categorized as monochrome 
ethnic, racial or cultural blocs, especially in the ethics 
of policing and the media. And it must foster a view 
of identity that is not afraid of seeing the contingency 
of identity in the difference of the Other. Finally, it 
must legitimize networking with kin-states by de-
anachronizing this relationship in a time where 
economic minority participation is vital for regional 
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development. To ensure that national minorities are 
enabled to present their culturally induced interests in 
an effective and empowered manner, we must 
assemble a tool-kit that engages with all these 







Table 1 – EU Regional policy regions where minorities reside 
 
Convergence regions 
EUR 199.3 million 
Phasing-out regions 
EUR 14 million 
 
Phasing-in regions 
EUR 11.4 million 
 
Competitive regions 
EUR 43.6 million 
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